Retreat to Victory

Mons: Retreat to Victory, by John Terraine, is an account of the retreat of the British Expeditionary Force (B.E.F.) and the French Armies following the invasion of Belgium in 1914. In sparse yet graphic language, Terraine chronicles attempts by the Germans to outflank the Allies, and to cut through all opposition in Northern France like a scythe. The bold endeavor almost succeeded. That it did not is due both to the timidity of German High Command, and to the bravery of the Allies. It was, however, a close run thing. Here are a couple of impressions from my reading.

First, wars are not won on paper. Von Schlieffen, the German commander at the turn of the century, laid the groundwork for the maneuver which could have destroyed France and its Allies within a few weeks. Pivoting on Alsace-Lorraine, the whole force of the German war machine could have swept all before it - if its forces had been deployed according to Von Schlieffen's plan. Instead, Von Moltke, Von Bulow and other leaders reinforced the line where it needed to bend, and weakened it where it needed superior strength. The plan failed because they failed.

The British and French also failed because of their inability to read the tide of battle. Intelligence reports were either ignored or forced to fit within some preconceived idea. Estimates of opposing strength were far too low, despite evidence of troop movements gathered by those who flew the new-fangled flying machines. The British, under Sir John French, seemed to have difficulty in adapting to changing circumstances. The French forces, under Joffre, were simply blind to danger. For forty years they had planned their revenge upon the Germans. They had dreamed of forcibly removing the teutonic oppressor from occupied lands in what had once been North East France. The spirit of Napoleon I was alive and well in the French army. Its generals vowed to attack at every opportunity and not to yield an inch of sacred earth. Too frequently, that earth became a grave as patriotic young Frenchmen still dressed in the red kepis and long blue capotes of the Second Empire, hurled themselves against forces they could not hope to break. The plans of grey-haired generals, far from the front-line, were far removed from the realities of conflict .

Second, in war, very few people have any idea what they are doing. Those who have at least some idea are at a huge advantage. The detailed accounts of the withdrawal of the B.E.F. demonstrate a remarkable degree of forethought, most often exercised by supply officers down the line, not by those caught up in the action. An army in retreat still needs to be fed. It requires ammunition and supplies. The wounded must still be evacuated. Lines of communication must be established and renewed whenever necessary. But when it comes down to it, especially when moving through a heavily-industrialized area, the movement of so many men is littered with misunderstandings and mistakes. If the retreat is not uniform, units can become isolated and enveloped, as happened to members of the Cheshire Regiment. Despite the skills of impressive and experienced commanders such as General Smith-Dorrien, whose reputation was largely made during the retreat from Mons, it must be admitted that the success of the operation was due, in no small measure, to the failure of the Germans to press home their advantage. Some German troops said later that they had expected the British to mount a counter-attack, so badly mauled had the Germans been in their attempts to advance. They did not realize their numerical superiority, nor the large gaps that sometimes appeared between Allied Corps. The history of war may be told on maps in bright colors, but it is written in fog, in shades of grey.

If there is something to be learned, apart from the folly of war, it is that persistence and imagination often have their reward. When, in the end, the German armies pushed too far and exposed their flank, it was those who had seen strategic retreat as a means to victory who were ready to pounce. The small-minded, vainglorious fools who had refused to listen understood how to lead men to their defeat, but not much more. It was those nearing retirement, Petain and Foch, who became the leaders of revitalized France. While the young could only impale themselves on steel, experience taught older heads to feint, to parry, and then to strike.

Life is not war, though it sometimes feels like it. But it seems that there is, after all, something to be said for the wisdom that comes from experience, as long as it is still open to innovation and risk. The other lesson, if you are looking for one, is that patience is often the best policy, as long as it does not become an excuse for indecision. Knowing when to strike and when to hold back can often be the difference between victory and defeat.